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  • 厄瓜多尔、危地马拉、洪都拉斯、墨西哥、美国诉欧盟香蕉进口销售、分销体制的纠纷
  • European Communities — Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas. (Brought by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, US)
  • 文书
    Appellate Body - European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - AB-1997-3 - Report of the Appellate Body
    提纲
    (Synopsis)
      ……
      (此处省略若干字,欲需查看全文请成为法意会员或购买法意检索阅读卡
    相关条款
    (Articles)
  • AGR 00.
  • GATS 00.
  • GATS II
  • GATS XVII
  • GATT 1994
  • GATT 1994 I.01
  • GATT 1994 III
  • GATT 1994 III.04
  • GATT 1994 X
  • GATT 1994 X.03.a
  • GATT 1994 XIII
  • LIC 1994
  • LIC 1994 01.03
  • 机构
    (Bodies)
  • 上诉机构 (Appellate Body)
  • 争端解决机构 (Dispute Settlement Body)
  • Panel WTO : European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas
  • 涉案国家
    (Countries)
  • 伯利兹城(洪都拉斯首都) (Belize)
  • 喀麦隆 (Cameroon)
  • 哥伦比亚 (Colombia)
  • 哥斯达黎加 (Costa Rica)
  • 科特迪瓦 (C?te d'Ivoire)
  • 多米尼加 (Dominica)
  • 多米尼加共和国 (Dominican Republic)
  • 厄瓜多尔 (Ecuador)
  • 欧盟 (European Union)
  • 加纳 (Ghana)
  • 格林纳达 (Grenada)
  • 危地马拉 (Guatemala)
  • 洪都拉斯 (Honduras)
  • 牙买加 (Jamaica)
  • 日本 (Japan)
  • 墨西哥 (Mexico)
  • 尼加拉瓜 (Nicaragua)
  • 圣卢西亚 (Saint Lucia)
  • 圣文森特和格林纳丁斯 (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)
  • 塞内加尔 (Senegal)
  • 苏里南 (Suriname)
  • 美国 (United States)
  • 委内瑞拉 (Venezuela)
  • 涉案产品
    (Products)
  • 香蕉 (bananas)
  • 主题
    (Subjects)
  • 争端解决 (DISPUTE SETTLEMENT)
  • 专家组 (PANEL)
  • 进口政策 (IMPORT POLICY)
  • 无歧视待遇 (NON-DISCRIMINATION)
  • 农业 (AGRICULTURE)
  • 进口专利权 (IMPORT LICENSING)
  • 国内税收 (INTERNAL TAXES)
  • 许可证 (LICENCES)
  • 专利使用权 (LICENSING)
  • 洛美协定 (LOME CONVENTION)
  • 最惠国待遇 (MFN TREATMENT)
  • 国民待遇 (NATIONAL TREATMENT)
  • 无效或亏损 (NULLIFICATION OR IMPAIRMENT)
  • 定量限制 (QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS)
  • 服务 (SERVICES)
  • 自动放弃 (WAIVER)
  • 文书类别
    (Types)
  • 关键性文件 (Key document)
  • 报告 (Report)
  • 全文

    WT/DS27/AB/R [WP for Windows Docs]

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    World

    Trade牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?WT/DS27/AB/R

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    September 1997

    Organization

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    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>Appellate

    Body

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    style='font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua"'>EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES -

    REGIME FOR THE

    style='font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua"'>IMPORTATION, SALE AND

    DISTRIBUTION OF BANANAS

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    style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.15pt'>牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?AB-1997-3

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    style='font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.15pt'>牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋 Report

    of the Appellate Body

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    I.牋牋牋牋?Introduction................................................................................................................. ?/p>

    1

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    牋牋牋牋牋?A.牋牋牋?Procedural Matters............................................................................................ ?/p>

    4

    牋牋牋牋牋?B.牋牋牋牋 Oral Hearing..................................................................................................... ?/p>

    7

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    II.牋牋牋牋 Arguments of the Participants................................................................................... ?/p>

    7

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    牋牋牋牋牋?A.牋牋牋?European Communities - Appellant................................................................... ?/p>

    7

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?1.牋牋牋牋 Preliminary Issues............................................................................... ?/p>

    8

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(a)牋牋牋?Right of

    the United States to Advance Claims under the GATT 1994牋牋牋 ?8

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(b)牋牋牋?Specificity

    of the Request for Establishment of the Panel..... ?9

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?2.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation of the Agreement

    on Agriculture.................................. ?9

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?3.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation of

    Article XIII of the GATT 1994............................... 10

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?4.牋牋牋牋 Separate Regimes...............................................................................

    11

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?5.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation of the

    Lom?Convention and Scope and Coverage of the Lom?Waiver.................................................................................................

    13

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?6.牋牋牋牋 Licensing Agreement............................................................................

    14

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?7.牋牋牋牋 Articles I:1 and

    X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement.............................................................................................................

    14

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?8.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation of

    Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.............................. 15

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?9.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation of

    Article I:1 of the GATT 1994................................. 16

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?10.牋牋牋 Measures Affecting

    Trade in Services............................................... 17

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?11.牋牋牋 Scope of Article II of

    the GATS......................................................... 20

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?12.牋牋牋 Effective Date of GATS

    Obligations.................................................. 22

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?13.牋牋牋 Burden of Proof..................................................................................

    22

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?14.牋牋牋 Definition of Wholesale

    Trade Services............................................. 23

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?15.牋牋牋 Alleged Discrimination

    Under Articles II and XVII of the GATS... 24

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(a)牋牋牋?Operator

    Category Rules....................................................... 24

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(b)牋牋牋?Activity

    Function Rules ......................................................... ?5

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(c)牋牋牋?Hurricane

    Licences................................................................. 25

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?16.牋牋牋 Nullification or

    Impairment............................................................... 25

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    牋牋牋牋牋?B.牋牋牋牋 Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,

    Mexico and the United States - Appellees...... 26

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?1.牋牋牋牋 Trade in Goods...................................................................................

    26

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(a)牋牋牋?Country

    Allocations............................................................... 26

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(b)牋牋牋?Licensing

    Agreement................................................................

    28

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(c)牋牋牋?Article

    III of the GATT 1994.................................................. 29

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(d)牋牋牋 Article I:1

    of the GATT 1994................................................. 30

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(e)牋牋牋?Article X

    of the GATT 1994................................................... 31

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(f)牋牋牋?Hurricane

    Licences................................................................. 31

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?2.牋牋牋牋 General Agreement

    on Trade in Services.............................................. 32

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(a)牋牋牋?Threshold

    Legal Issues........................................................... 32

    牋牋牋牋牋?牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(b)牋牋牋?Application

    of GATS to the EC Licensing System ............... ?5

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?3.牋牋牋牋 Procedural

    Issues................................................................................

    38

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(a)牋牋牋?Request

    for Establishment of a Panel.................................... 38

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(b)牋牋牋?Right of

    the United States to Advance Claims under the GATT 1994牋牋牋 39

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(c)牋牋牋?Nullification

    or Impairment................................................... 40

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    牋牋牋牋牋?C.牋牋牋?Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,

    Mexico and the United States - Appellants.... 41

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?1.牋牋牋牋 Scope of the Lom?/p>

    Waiver................................................................. 41

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?2.牋牋牋牋 Measures

    "required" by the Lom?Convention.................................

    42

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?3.牋牋牋牋 GATS Claims of

    Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico....................... 43

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?4.牋牋牋牋 Scope of the Appeal...........................................................................

    43

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    牋牋牋牋牋?D.牋牋牋?European Communities - Appellee....................................................................

    44

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?1.牋牋牋牋 Lom?Waiver --

    Traditional ACP Bananas ...................................... ?4

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?2.牋牋牋牋 Lom?Waiver --

    Preferential Treatment of Non-Traditional Bananas 45

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?3.牋牋牋牋 GATS Claims of

    Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico....................... 46

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    III.牋牋牋 Arguments of the Third Participants........................................................................

    46

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    牋牋牋牋牋?A. 牋牋牋 Belize, Cameroon, C魌e d'Ivoire,

    Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent

    and the Grenadines, Senegal and Suriname.......................... 46

    牋牋牋牋牋?B.牋牋牋牋 Colombia..........................................................................................................

    51

    牋牋牋牋牋?C.牋牋牋?Costa Rica and Venezuela.................................................................................

    53

    牋牋牋牋牋?D. 牋牋牋 Nicaragua........................................................................................................

    56

    牋牋牋牋牋?E.牋牋牋牋 Japan................................................................................................................

    57

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    IV.牋牋牋 Issues Raised in this Appeal......................................................................................

    58

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    牋牋牋牋牋?A.牋牋牋?Preliminary Issues............................................................................................

    62

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?1.牋牋牋牋 Right of the United

    States to Bring Claims under the GATT 1994.. 62

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?2.牋牋牋牋 Request for

    Establishment of the Panel............................................. 64

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?3.牋牋牋牋 GATS Claims by

    Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico....................... 65

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?4.牋牋牋牋 Ecuador's Right to

    Invoke Article XIII of the GATT 1994................ 67

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    牋牋牋牋牋?B.牋牋牋牋 Multilateral Agreements on

    Trade in Goods..................................................... 68

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?1.牋牋牋牋 Agreement on

    Agriculture....................................................................

    68

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?2.牋牋牋牋 Article XIII of the

    GATT 1994........................................................... 71

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?3.牋牋牋牋 The Scope of the Lom?/p>

    Waiver.......................................................... 73

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(a)牋牋牋?What is

    "required" by the Lom?Convention?...................... 74

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(b)牋牋牋?What is

    covered by the Lom?Waiver?.................................. 80

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?4.牋牋牋牋 The "Separate

    Regimes" Argument................................................... 82

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?5.牋牋牋牋 Licensing Agreement............................................................................

    84

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?6.牋牋牋牋 Article X:3(a) of the

    GATT 1994........................................................ 86

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?7.牋牋牋牋 Article I:1 of the

    GATT 1994............................................................. 88

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?8.牋牋牋牋 Article III of the

    GATT 1994.............................................................. 89

    牋牋牋牋牋?C.牋牋牋?General Agreement on Trade in

    Services.......................................................... 93

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    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?1.牋牋牋牋 Application of the

    GATS................................................................... 93

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?2.牋牋牋牋 Whether Operators are

    Service Suppliers Engaged in Wholesale Trade Services? 95

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?3.牋牋牋牋 Article II of the GATS........................................................................

    97

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?4.牋牋牋牋 Effective Date of the

    GATS Obligations............................................ 99

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?5.牋牋牋牋 Burden of Proof................................................................................. 100

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?6.牋牋牋牋 Whether the EC

    Licensing Procedures are Discriminatory Under Articles II and XVII of the GATS.............................................................................. 101

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(a)牋牋牋?Operator

    Category Rules...................................................... 102

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(b)牋牋牋?Activity

    Function Rules......................................................... 103

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?(c)牋牋牋?Hurricane

    Licences ............................................................... 104

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋?D.牋牋牋?Nullification or Impairment............................................................................. 105

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    V.牋牋牋?Findings and Conclusions......................................................................................... 107

    clear=all style='page-break-before:always'>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋 World

    Trade Organization

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋 Appellate

    Body

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='margin-left:6.0pt;border-collapse:collapse'>

    European Communities -

    Regime for

    the Importation, Sale and

    Distribution

    of Bananas

     

    European Communities, Appellant/Appellee

     

    Ecuador, Guatemala,

    Honduras, Mexico and the United States, Appellants/Appellees

     

    Belize, Cameroon, Colombia,

    Costa Rica, C魌e d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Grenada,

    Jamaica, Japan, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal,

    Suriname and Venezuela, Third Participants

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋?AB-1997-3

     

    牋牋牋牋牋?

    牋牋牋牋牋?

    牋牋牋牋牋?Present:

     

    牋牋牋牋牋?Bacchus,

    Presiding Member

    牋牋牋牋牋?Beeby, Member

    牋牋牋牋牋?El-Naggar,

    Member

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>I.牋牋牋牋?Introduction

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>1

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 The

    European Communities and Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United

    States (the "Complaining Parties") appeal from certain issues of law

    and legal interpretations in the Panel Reports, European Communities -

    Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas

    name="_ftnref1" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[1] (the "Panel

    Reports").?The Panel was established on 8 May 1996 to consider a

    complaint by the Complaining Parties against the European Communities

    concerning the regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas

    established by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the

    common organization of the market in bananas ("Regulation 404/93")

    href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[2], and subsequent EC

    legislation, regulations and administrative measures, including those

    reflecting the provisions of the Framework Agreement on Bananas (the

    "BFA"), which implement, supplement and amend that regime.?The

    relevant factual aspects of the EC common market organization for bananas are

    described fully at paragraphs 3.1 to 3.36 of the Panel Reports.

    name="_ftnref3" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[3]

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>2

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 The

    Panel issued four Panel Reports that were circulated to the Members of the

    World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on 22 May 1997.?The Panel

    Reports contain the following conclusions:

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋?With

    respect to Ecuador, in paragraph 9.1 of the Report, WT/DS27/R/ECU, the Panel

    concluded:

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?... that for the reasons outlined in this Report

    aspects of the European Communities' import regime for bananas are inconsistent

    with its obligations under Articles I:1, III:4, X:3 and XIII:1 of GATT, Article

    1.2 of the Licensing Agreement and Articles II and XVII of the GATS.?These

    conclusions are also described briefly in the summary of findings.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋?With

    respect to Guatemala and Honduras, in paragraph 9.1 of the Reports,

    WT/DS27/R/GTM and WT/DS27/R/HND, the Panel concluded:

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?... that for the reasons outlined in this Report

    aspects of the European Communities' import regime for bananas are inconsistent

    with its obligations under Articles I:1, III:4, X:3 and XIII:1 of GATT and

    Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement.?These conclusions are also described

    briefly in the summary of findings.

    clear=all style='page-break-before:always'>

    牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>With

    respect to Mexico, in paragraph 9.1 of the Report, WT/DS27/R/MEX, the Panel

    concluded:

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?... that for the reasons outlined in this Report

    aspects of the European Communities' import regime for bananas are inconsistent

    with its obligations under Articles I:1, III:4, X:3 and XIII:1 of GATT,

    Articles 1.2 and 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement and Articles II and XVII of the

    GATS.?These conclusions are also described briefly in the summary of findings.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋?With

    respect to the United States, in paragraph 9.1 of the Report, WT/DS27/R/USA,

    the Panel concluded:

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?... that for the reasons outlined in this Report

    aspects of the European Communities' import regime for bananas are inconsistent

    with its obligations under Articles I:1, III:4, X:3 and XIII:1 of GATT, Article

    1.3 of the Licensing Agreement and Articles II and XVII of the GATS.?These

    conclusions are also described briefly in the summary of findings.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋?In

    each of the Panel Reports, the Panel made the following recommendation:

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?... that the Dispute Settlement Body request the

    European Communities to bring its import regime for bananas into conformity

    with its obligations under GATT, the Licensing Agreement and the GATS.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>3

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 On

    11 June 1997, the European Communities notified the Dispute Settlement Body

    href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[4] (the "DSB") of its

    decision to appeal certain issues of law covered in the Panel Reports and

    certain legal interpretations developed by the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 4

    of Article 16 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the

    Settlement of Disputes (the "DSU"), and filed a Notice of Appeal

    with the Appellate Body pursuant to Rule 20 of the Working Procedures for

    Appellate Review (the "Working Procedures").?On 23 June

    1997, the European Communities filed an appellant's submission pursuant to Rule

    21 of the Working Procedures.?On 26 June 1997, the Complaining Parties

    filed an appellant's submission pursuant to Rule 23(1) of the Working

    Procedures.?In accordance with Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures,

    and at the request of the Complaining Parties, the Appellate Body granted a

    two-day extension for the filing of appellees' and third participants'

    submissions.?On 9 July 1997, the Complaining Parties filed an appellee's

    submission pursuant to Rule 22 of the Working Procedures, and the

    European Communities filed an appellee's submission pursuant to Rule 23(3) of

    the Working Procedures.?Ecuador also filed a separate appellee's

    submission on that date.?A joint third participants' submission was filed by

    Belize, Cameroon, C魌e d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Grenada,

    Jamaica, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal and Suriname (the

    "ACP third participants") on 9 July 1997 pursuant to Rule 24 of the Working

    Procedures.?That same day, Colombia, Nicaragua and Japan filed third

    participants' submissions and a joint third participants' submission was filed

    by Costa Rica and Venezuela.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>A.牋牋牋?Procedural

    Matters

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>4

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 On

    10 July 1997, pursuant to Rule 16(2) of the Working Procedures, the

    Government of Jamaica asked the Appellate Body to postpone the dates of the

    oral hearing, set out in the working schedule for 21 and 22 July 1997, to 4 and

    5 August 1997.?This request was not granted as the Appellate Body was not

    persuaded that there were exceptional circumstances resulting in manifest

    unfairness to any participant or third participant that justified the

    postponement of the oral hearing in this appeal.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>5

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 By

    letter of 9 July 1997, the Government of Saint Lucia submitted reasons

    justifying the participation of two specialist legal advisers, who are not

    full-time government employees of Saint Lucia, in the Appellate Body oral

    hearing.?Saint Lucia argued that there are two separate issues concerning

    rights of representation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.?The first

    issue is whether a state may have its case presented before a panel or the

    Appellate Body by private lawyers.?The second issue deals with the sovereign

    right of a state to decide who constitutes its official government

    representatives or delegation.?On the second, and more fundamental issue,

    Saint Lucia submitted that as a matter of customary international law, no

    international organization has the right to interfere with a government's

    sovereign right to decide whom it may accredit as officials and members of its

    delegation.?Furthermore, Saint Lucia noted that neither the DSU nor the Working

    Procedures deal with the issue of a sovereign state's entitlement to

    appoint its delegation or accredit persons as full and proper representatives

    of its government.?Saint Lucia maintained that to do so would go beyond the

    powers of a panel, the Appellate Body or the WTO under customary international

    law.?Saint Lucia also observed that there is no provision in the DSU or in the

    Working Procedures requiring governments to nominate only government

    employees as their counsel in WTO panel or Appellate Body proceedings.?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>6

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 The

    Governments of Canada and Jamaica supported the request by Saint Lucia.?In a

    letter of 14 July 1997, Canada stated its concurrence with the proposition

    advanced by Saint Lucia that the composition of a WTO Member's delegation, in

    the absence of any rules to the contrary, is a matter internal to the Member

    itself.?Canada argued that it is the Member's right to authorize those

    individuals it considers necessary or appropriate to represent its interests.?/p>

    Canada maintained that it is not appropriate for a panel or the Appellate Body

    to verify the credentials of individuals that a Member has authorized to

    participate in its delegation.?By letter of 14 July 1997, Jamaica also

    submitted that a government has the right to determine the composition of its

    own delegation within the context of international law and practice.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>7

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 On

    14 July 1997, the Complaining Parties filed a written submission opposing the

    request of Saint Lucia for permission to allow non-governmental employees to

    participate in the Appellate Body's oral hearing in this appeal.?The

    Complaining Parties pointed out that the Panel ruled, in its first substantive

    meeting with the parties on 10 September 1996, that the private counsel seeking

    to represent Saint Lucia were not entitled to attend the Panel's meetings in

    this case.?The Complaining Parties noted that "the Panel's ruling is not

    specifically appealed in this appeal".

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>8

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 With

    respect to Saint Lucia's request that its legal advisers be granted an

    opportunity to participate in the Appellate Body's oral hearing, the Complaining

    Parties argued that there is no basis for the WTO to change its established

    practice in this area, and that such a change would entail a fundamental change

    in the premises underlying the WTO dispute settlement system.?The Complaining

    Parties maintained that the rules of international law governing diplomatic

    relations, particularly those codified in the Vienna Convention on

    Diplomatic Relations

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[5],

    do not support the proposition that a government can name whomever it wants as

    a member of its delegation to represent it in a foreign international body.?/p>

    The Complaining Parties also argued that the Vienna Convention on the

    Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations of

    a Universal Character

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[6]

    has never come into force and has not been ratified by any of the major host

    states, including Switzerland and the United States, and as such is not

    applicable to the WTO.?The Complaining Parties argued that the law of

    diplomatic representation does not give states carte blanche as to whom

    they may appoint to their delegations.?Furthermore, with respect to the

    practice of other international organizations and international tribunals, the

    Complaining Parties argued that where participation of outside counsel is

    permitted, it is done so in accordance with specific written rules which have

    been negotiated and agreed to by parties to that organization or treaty.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>9

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋牋 The

    Complaining Parties submitted that from the earliest years of the General

    Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATT"), presentations by

    governments in dispute settlement proceedings have been made exclusively by

    government lawyers or government trade experts.?With respect to developing

    countries, the Complaining Parties argued that, unlike the practice before

    other international tribunals, under the provisions of Article 27.2 of the DSU,

    developing countries are entitled to legal assistance from the WTO

    Secretariat.?The Complaining Parties also cited certain policy reasons in

    support of their position.?WTO dispute settlement, they argued, is dispute

    settlement among governments, and it is for this reason that the DSU safeguards

    the privacy of the parties during recourse to dispute settlement procedures.?/p>

    Furthermore, the Complaining Parties asserted that if private lawyers were

    allowed to participate in panel meetings and Appellate Body oral hearings, a

    number of questions concerning lawyers' ethics, conflicts of interest,

    representation of multiple governments and confidentiality would need to be

    resolved.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>10

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 On

    15 July 1997, the Appellate Body notified the participants and third

    participants in this appeal of its ruling that the request by Saint Lucia would

    be allowed.?The Appellate Body said the following:

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?... we can find nothing in the Marrakesh

    Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the "WTO

    Agreement"), the DSU or the Working Procedures, nor in

    customary international law or the prevailing practice of international

    tribunals, which prevents a WTO Member from determining the composition of its

    delegation in Appellate Body proceedings.?Having carefully considered the

    request made by the government of Saint Lucia, and the responses dated 14 July

    1997 received from Canada;?Jamaica;?Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and

    the United States, we rule that it is for a WTO Member to decide who should

    represent it as members of its delegation in an oral hearing of the Appellate

    Body.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>11

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 In

    providing additional reasons for our ruling in this Report, it is important to

    note first to what this ruling does and does not apply.?A request was received

    from the Government of Saint Lucia to allow the participation of two legal

    counsel, who are not government employees of Saint Lucia, in the oral hearing

    of the Appellate Body in this appeal.?This is not an appeal of the Panel's ruling

    concerning the participation of the same counsel in the panel meetings with the

    parties in this case.?The Panel's ruling was not appealed by a party to the

    dispute

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[7],

    and thus that ruling is not before us in this appeal.?Second, it is well-known

    that in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, many governments seek and obtain

    extensive assistance from private counsel, who are not employees of the

    governments concerned, in advising on legal issues;?preparing written

    submissions to panels as well as to the Appellate Body;?preparing written

    responses to questions from panels and from other parties as well as from the

    Appellate Body;?and other preparatory work relating to panel and Appellate

    Body proceedings.?These practices are not at issue before us.?The sole issue

    before us is whether Saint Lucia is entitled to be represented by counsel of

    its own choice in the Appellate Body's oral hearing.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>12

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 We

    note that there are no provisions in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing

    the World Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement"), in the

    DSU or in the Working Procedures that specify who can represent a

    government in making its representations in an oral hearing of the Appellate

    Body.?With respect to GATT practice, we can find no previous panel report

    which speaks specifically to this issue in the context of panel meetings with

    the parties.?We also note that representation by counsel of a government's own

    choice may well be a matter of particular significance -- especially for

    developing-country Members -- to enable them to participate fully in dispute

    settlement proceedings.?Moreover, given the Appellate Body's mandate to review

    only issues of law or legal interpretation in panel reports, it is particularly

    important that governments be represented by qualified counsel in Appellate

    Body proceedings.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>B.牋牋牋牋 Oral

    Hearing

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>13

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    oral hearing was held on 21, 22 and 23 July 1997.?In his opening statement,

    the Presiding Member of the Division reminded the participants and third

    participants that the purpose of the oral hearing was to clarify and distil the

    legal issues raised in this appeal.?The participants and third participants

    presented oral arguments, were questioned by the Members of the Division

    hearing this appeal, and made concluding statements.?The third participants

    participated fully in all aspects of the oral hearing.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>II.牋牋牋?Arguments

    of the Participants

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>A.牋牋牋?European

    Communities - Appellant

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>14

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities appeals from certain of the Panel's legal findings and

    conclusions as well as from certain legal interpretations developed by the

    Panel.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    clear=all style='page-break-before:always'>

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>1.牋牋牋牋 Preliminary

    Issues

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>(a)牋牋牋?Right

    of the United States to Advance Claims under the GATT 1994

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>15

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities argues that the Panel infringed Article 3.2 of the DSU by

    finding that the United States has a right to advance claims under the GATT

    1994.?The European Communities asserts that, as a general principle, in any

    system of law, including international law, a claimant must normally have a

    legal right or interest in the claim it is pursuing.?The European Communities

    refers to judgments of the Permanent Court of International Justice (the

    "PCIJ") and the International Court of Justice (the "ICJ")

    as support for its argument that the concept of actio popularis "is

    not known to international law as it stands at present".

    name="_ftnref8" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[8]

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>16

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 According

    to the European Communities, treaty law is a "method of contracting out of

    general international law".?Therefore, the WTO Agreement must

    contain a rejection of the requirement of a legal interest or an acceptance of

    the notion of actio popularis in order to conclude that the WTO dispute

    settlement system sets aside the requirement of a legal interest.?The absence

    of such an express rule in the DSU or in the other covered agreements indicates

    that general international law must be applied.?The European Communities

    maintains that the reasoning advanced by the Panel that all parties to a treaty

    have an interest in its observance is a general observation which is true for

    all treaties.?The European Communities submits that this has not been accepted

    by the ICJ as a valid proposition under general international law granting all

    parties to a multilateral treaty locus standi in all cases.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>17

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities also argues that the provisions of Article 10.2 of the

    DSU, allowing a WTO Member that has "a substantial interest in the matter

    before a panel" to participate as a third party, suggest a fortiori

    that a party to a dispute must show a legal interest.?The European Communities

    asserts that the United States has no actual or potential trade interest

    justifying its claim, since its banana production is minimal, it has never

    exported bananas, and this situation is unlikely to change due to climatic and

    economic conditions in the United States.?In the view of the European

    Communities, the Panel fails to explain how the United States has a potential

    trade interest in bananas, and production alone does not suffice for a

    potential trade interest.?The European Communities also contends that the

    United States has no right protected by WTO law to shield its own internal

    market from the indirect effects of the EC banana regime.

     

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>(b)牋牋牋?Specificity

    of the Request for Establishment of the Panel

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>18

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities argues that Article 6.2 of the DSU requires that a

    "specific measure" be identified, which implies that the mere

    identification of the legislation or regulations at issue is not sufficient,

    especially if they are broad and extensive and if only specific aspects of them

    are being attacked.?The European Communities asserts that "specific

    measures at issue" should be given a substantive meaning and not a

    formalistic interpretation.?The European Communities submits further that the

    request for establishment of a panel must at the very least make a link between

    the specific measure concerned and the article of the specific agreement

    allegedly infringed thereby in order to give both the defending party and

    prospective third parties a clear idea of what the alleged infringements are.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>2.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation

    of the Agreement on Agriculture

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>19

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 In

    the view of the European Communities, the Panel erred in interpreting Article

    4.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.?The European Communities submits

    that the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates that Members

    were aware of the uniqueness and the specificity of the negotiations concerning

    agricultural products in the Uruguay Round as compared to tariff negotiations

    in other areas.?Two elements of this specificity are especially important in

    the context of these proceedings.?First, the transition from a highly

    restrictive system, largely based on non-tariff barriers, to more open market

    access for agricultural products had to be progressive.?Second, the process of

    reform initiated by the Agreement on Agriculture was aimed at achieving

    binding commitments in three areas:?market access, domestic support and export

    competition.?The fundamental achievement of this reform process was the

    obligation to remove non-tariff barriers and to convert them into tariff

    equivalents, including tariff quotas.?The European Communities contends that

    the Panel's failure to take into account both the context and the negotiating

    history of the Agreement on Agriculture, in particular as evidenced by

    the Modalities document

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[9],

    contributed to the Panel's erroneous interpretation of Article 4.1.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>20

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities argues that Article 4.1 is a substantive provision.?Read

    in conjunction with Article 1(g), it defines the market access commitments

    regarding agricultural products contained in the Schedules as "commitments

    undertaken pursuant to the Agreement on Agriculture".?In support

    of its argument, the European Communities also refers to the Panel's

    interpretation of Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.?In the

    view of the European Communities, Article 21.1 confirms the "agricultural

    specificity" in its clearest form and demonstrates that the rules of the Agreement

    on Agriculture, including the Schedules specifically referred to in Article

    4.1, supersede the provisions of the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A

    agreements, where appropriate.?The European Communities submits that pursuant

    to Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article XIII:2(d) of

    the GATT 1994 is applicable to market access commitments, subject to the

    provision of Article 4.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture allowing the

    inclusion in those commitments of "other market access commitments as

    specified" in the Schedule.?The European Communities does not contest

    that the Members' Schedules are formally annexed to the GATT 1994.?However, in

    applying the rule of priority in the implementation of the WTO rules relating

    to agricultural products, as set out in Article 21.1 of the Agreement on

    Agriculture, the provisions of the GATT 1994 shall be applied with regard

    to the parts of the Schedules concerning the agricultural products

    "subject to the provisions" of the Agreement on Agriculture,

    and in particular, Article 4.1.?The market access commitments contained in the

    part of each Member's Schedule relating to agricultural products shall

    therefore be those resulting from the "bindings and reductions of tariffs,

    and other market access commitments as specified therein".

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>21

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities submits further that the fact that a number of Members

    have used tariff quotas, with country-specific allocations and an

    "others" category for making current access commitments, is a clear

    indication that the practice of allocating tariff quotas in this manner was

    considered acceptable under the Agreement on Agriculture.?The European

    Communities asserts that the Panel's conclusion that this practice is contrary

    to Article XIII of the GATT 1994, and is not protected by Article 21.1 of the Agreement

    on Agriculture, will destroy a large part of the results of the Uruguay

    Round negotiations on agriculture relating to tariffication.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>3.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation

    of Article XIII of the GATT 1994

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>22

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities disagrees with several aspects of the Panel's conclusions

    on Article XIII of the GATT 1994.?The European Communities argues that while

    Article XIII:2(d) does not explicitly permit allocations on the basis of

    agreement with some Members not having a substantial interest, it does not

    forbid that possibility.?The only unequivocal obligation flowing from Article

    XIII, with respect to Members not having a substantial interest, is to ensure

    that any Member is entitled to have access to at least a share of the tariff

    rate quota that approaches, as closely as possible, the share it would expect

    to receive in the absence of that tariff rate quota.?The European Communities

    submits that an agreement on the allocation of the tariff quota shares with as

    many supplying countries as possible cannot be against the object and purpose

    of Article XIII.?Furthermore, the terms of Article XIII:2(d) do not exclude

    the combined use of agreements and unilateral allocations for substantial

    suppliers.?What is important, for the allocation to be in conformity with

    Article XIII, is that any Member not able to reach an agreement with the

    importing Member should not be penalized in its access to the tariff rate

    quota.?The European Communities refers to the panel report in Norway -

    Restrictions on Imports of Certain Textile Products

    name="_ftnref10" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[10] ("Norway - Imports

    of Textile Products"), arguing that if the combined use of allocation

    methods is allowed for Members having a substantial interest, it is also

    allowed for Members not having a substantial interest.?More specifically, with

    respect to Guatemala, the European Communities maintains that Guatemala cannot

    be considered as having been harmed in its trade interests in bananas in any

    way by the decision of the European Communities to include it in the

    "others" category, which amounts to 49 per cent of the tariff rate

    quota.?In addition, the European Communities asserts that the tariff quota

    reallocation rules for the BFA are not inconsistent with Article XIII.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>4.牋牋牋牋 Separate

    Regimes

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>23

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities argues that there are, in fact, two separate EC import

    regimes for bananas:?one preferential regime for traditional ACP bananas and

    one erga omnes regime for all other imported bananas.?The European

    Communities contends further that the non-discrimination obligations of

    Articles I:1, X:3(a) and XIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Agreement

    on Import Licensing Procedures (the "Licensing Agreement"),

    only apply within each of these two regimes.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>24

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities takes the view that in the context of the tariff

    negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the issue of specified quantities of

    traditional ACP bananas under the preferential treatment provided for by the

    Lom?Convention was never raised nor discussed, let alone negotiated or

    included in the EC GATT Schedule LXXX.?Legally, this implies that, under the

    preferential treatment of the Lom?Convention, the specified quantities of

    imports of traditional ACP bananas are not part of the bound commitments of the

    erga omnes regime and that the obligations of the European Communities vis-?vis

    Members that are parties to the Lom?Convention have their source in the

    Convention itself and not in the GATT 1994.?Furthermore, the allocation by the

    European Communities of the tariff quota in the EC Schedule is not only

    separate from, but also irrelevant to, the allocation of ACP preferential

    quantities, and a licence for the importation of bananas at the in-quota

    reduced rate could never be used to import bananas from any traditional ACP

    State.?Therefore, the European Communities submits that the Panel's conclusion

    that there is a single licensing regime is simply refusing to see what happens

    in the real world.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>25

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 In

    support of this "separate regimes" argument, the European Communities

    refers to the Panel on Newsprint.

    title="">

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[11]?/p>

    The European Communities claims that the situations in that panel report and in

    this case are identical, in particular, the relationship between an erga

    omnes tariff rate quota and preferential treatment under a preferential

    agreement.?The European Communities admits that there is a partial (and rather

    formalistic) difference between the present case and the Panel on Newsprint

    case in that the preferential regime in the latter case was justified under

    Article XXIV of the GATT 1947.?The European Communities argues that this

    does not affect the relevance of the Panel on Newsprint case, because

    the preferential nature of the Lom?Convention has not been contested and the

    European Communities continues to believe that the Lom?Convention is justified

    under Article XXIV.?The European Communities is concerned that the Panel's

    findings would oblige the European Communities to include traditional ACP

    bananas in the current tariff quota for non-traditional ACP and third-country

    bananas, i.e. to increase or modify the concessions made by the European

    Communities in the context of the Uruguay Round.?This would affect the balance

    of rights and obligations resulting from the Uruguay Round negotiations on

    agriculture.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>26

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities submits that the Panel ignored the "objective legal

    situation" that the common organization of the market in bananas has three

    separate elements:?an internal one, a general external one and a preferential

    one.?The European Communities asserts that the plain language of the GATT 1994

    indicates that Article XIII applies to the non-discriminatory administration of

    quantitative restrictions and tariff quotas.?The European Communities contends

    that it has only one tariff quota concerning bananas -- the tariff quota of 2.2

    million tonnes set out in the EC Schedule ‑‑ and that the

    preferential quantities of traditional ACP bananas are not included in this

    tariff quota.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>5.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation

    of the Lom?Convention and Scope and Coverage of the Lom?Waiver

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>27

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities submits that the Panel endorsed a different interpretation

    of the Lom?Convention and of the Lom?Waiver

    title="">

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[12]

    from the one commonly accepted by the parties to that Convention.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>28

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities argues that the decision taken by the EC Council in its

    meeting of 14 to 17 December 1992 reflects a clear common understanding that

    "... the Lom?commitments will be met by allowing tariff-free imports from

    each ACP State up to a traditional level reflecting its highest sendings (best

    ever) in any one year up to and including 1990.?In cases where it can be shown

    that investment had already been committed to a programme of expanding

    production, a higher figure may be set for that ACP State".?The reasons

    for this decision were in Protocol 5 on Bananas to the Lom?Convention

    ("Protocol 5") and in the obvious need not to waste EC public money

    and trade opportunities that the EC's financial intervention was trying to

    establish.?The best-ever shipments to the European Communities, by definition,

    are a statistical measure of past trade, but they in no way reflect an element

    of the present.?The European Communities argues that the Panel's

    interpretation is tantamount to reducing the words "at present" in

    Article 1 of Protocol 5 to redundancy.?Article 1 of Protocol 5 took into

    account a dynamic factual situation.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>29

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities disagrees with the Panel's conclusion that the current

    licensing system is not "an advantage" that the ACP countries enjoyed

    in the European Communities prior to the introduction of the banana regime.?/p>

    Before 1993, the licensing system operated by the United Kingdom and France

    applied only to imports from third countries, but not to traditional ACP

    imports.?Such an advantage, by virtue of Protocol 5, needed to be carried over

    into the licensing arrangements for the "new" EC banana regime.?The

    European Communities argues further that Article 167 of the Lom?Convention

    states that the object of the Convention is to promote trade between the ACP

    States and the European Communities, and that the Lom?Convention highlights

    the importance of improving conditions for market access for the ACP States.?/p>

    Article 167 clearly goes beyond a mere tariff preference insofar as it also

    provides for the securing of "effective additional advantages".?The

    effectiveness of the advantages is a key element thereof.?According to the

    European Communities, Protocol 5 requires the continuation of the advantages

    enjoyed by traditional ACP States.?Tariff preferences alone have been shown to

    be insufficient to ensure this.?Without the combined tariff preferences and

    the import licensing system, ACP bananas would not be competitive in the EC

    market, and the European Communities would therefore not be able to fulfil its

    obligations under the Lom?Convention.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>6.牋牋牋牋 Licensing

    Agreement

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>30

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 In

    the view of the European Communities, the Panel erred in law in interpreting

    the Licensing Agreement, in particular, Articles 1.2 and 1.3, as

    applicable to tariff quotas.?According to the European Communities, the Panel

    failed to distinguish appropriately "import quotas", which are

    quantitative restrictions, from "tariff quotas", which do not limit

    imports but rather regulate access to a reduced tariff rate.?The European

    Communities asserts that Article 1.1 of the Licensing Agreement defines

    an import licence as "... an application or other documentation ... to the

    relevant administrative body as a prior condition for importation into the

    customs territory of the importing Member".牋 The European Communities

    argues that the EC tariff quota licence is not a prior condition for

    importation.?It is necessary to gain access at a reduced rate, but not to import

    bananas.?The European Communities submits that Article 1.1 of the Licensing

    Agreement covers licences which are prior conditions "for

    importation", not "for importation at a lower duty rate".

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>7.牋牋牋牋 Articles

    I:1 and X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>31

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 With

    respect to the "neutrality" obligation in Article 1.3 of the Licensing

    Agreement, the European Communities submits that the letter, the context

    and the negotiating history, and even the Panel's own interpretation of the

    relationship between Article X of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Licensing

    Agreement, plead against the use of Article 1.3 of the Licensing

    Agreement as a legal tool to compare the requirements of different

    licensing systems.?The European Communities concludes that the use of Article

    1.3 of the Licensing Agreement in this way would duplicate Article I:1

    of the GATT 1994.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>32

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 In

    addition, the European Communities submits that Article X of the GATT 1994 is

    designed to ensure the transparency and the impartiality of public authorities

    charged with the administration of the relevant national legislation regarding

    trade.?The raison d'阾re of Article X is to ensure that administrative

    actions are as neutral as possible.?According to the European Communities, the

    Panel distorted the interpretation of this provision in such a way that Article

    X is now equivalent to a repetition of the most-favoured-nation

    ("MFN") provision in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.?The European

    Communities maintains that the Panel erred in finding that the requirements of

    uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness in Article X:3(a) do not refer to

    the administration of the laws, regulations, decisions and rulings, but to the

    laws, regulations, decisions and rulings themselves.?With respect to the

    interpretation of Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement, the European

    Communities agrees with the Panel that a perfect parallel can be made between

    Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement.?/p>

    However, Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement is lex specialis

    for the administration of import licensing procedures, while Article X:3(a) of the

    GATT 1994 is lex generalis for the administration of all "laws,

    regulations, decisions and rulings ...".?As a result of the Panel

    Reports, the European Communities queries whether it is possible to find a

    breach of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 without also finding an infringement

    of Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>8.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation

    of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>33

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities asserts that the Panel erred in finding that the licensing

    regime is an internal measure subject to Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, and

    not a border measure, and that the Panel misunderstood the notion of internal

    measures in the GATT 1994.?The European Communities refers to the panel report

    in Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery

    href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[13] ("Italian

    Agricultural Machinery") and argues that the word "all" in

    that report, when referring to measures that modify conditions of competition

    between domestic and imported products in domestic markets, is concerned with

    internal measures.?The European Communities asserts that the panel report in Italian

    Agricultural Machinery stands for the proposition that Article III applies

    only to measures applied to imported products "once they have cleared

    through customs".

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[14]

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>34

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities argues that a licence is a document which is a prior

    condition for applying the reduced duty-rate bound under the EC tariff quota to

    imported bananas.?This all happens before the bananas have cleared customs.?/p>

    According to the European Communities, the existence of the licence is

    justified by operations whose very nature is that of a border operation

    concerning the duty-rate applicable to that product.?The European Communities

    asserts that the Panel confuses the notion of border measures and the notion of

    adjustment at the border of an internal measure, the latter being the subject

    of Ad Article III of the GATT 1994.?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>35

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 In

    the case of the EC licensing system, it is obvious that domestic bananas are

    not subject to an import licence since they do not cross the border, do not

    clear customs, do not pay duty and are not included in any tariff quota.?/p>

    Therefore, the very application to an import licence of the notion of border

    adjustment in Ad Article III is legally wrong.?The European Communities

    refers to the panel report in United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act

    of 1930

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[15]

    ("United States - Section 337") in support of its

    interpretation.?The European Communities submits further that most of the

    licensing procedures are applied to persons rather than products.?The European

    Communities refers to the panel report in United States - Restrictions on

    Imports of Tuna

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>[16]

    ("United States - Imports of Tuna (1991)") in support of its

    argument that Article III cannot be used to compare treatment between persons

    but only between products.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>36

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 As

    to the effect of hurricane licences, the European Communities asserts that a

    simple side-effect resulting from the implementation of a measure pursuing a

    general internal policy, which has or might have an effect on the conditions of

    competition, should not be considered to infringe Article III:4 of the GATT

    1994 unless clear evidence is provided that this general policy measure was

    designed to afford protection to domestic products.?The European Communities

    asserts that hurricane licences are distributed only in the event of a proven

    catastrophe and are limited to the quantities lost due to the devastation

    caused by a hurricane.?Therefore, these licences are clearly a means of

    intervention to support the income of those domestic producers that are harmed

    by the hurricane.?The European Communities points out that operators can

    benefit from hurricane licences in two ways:?they can use them to import

    bananas from third countries, or they can sell the licences.?Hurricane

    licences by themselves do not affect the internal sale or offering for sale of

    domestic bananas to the detriment of imported bananas.?The only effect they

    have is an occasional increase in the EC tariff quota.?Finally, the European

    Communities asks whether WTO Members are not allowed to remedy the consequences

    of natural disasters within their own territories in order to prevent their

    producers from being eliminated.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>9.牋牋牋牋 Interpretation

    of Article I:1 of the GATT 1994

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>37

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities contends that the Panel erred in law in interpreting

    Article I:1 of the GATT 1994.?With respect to the activity function rules, the

    European Communities argues that discrimination occurs in treating identical

    situations differently, or in treating different situations in the same way.?/p>

    The Panel's findings would amount to compelling the European Communities to

    treat different situations concerning operators, in the same way, and by doing

    so, create additional burdens for some that would not be appropriate for the

    situation in which they are operating.?In the view of the European

    Communities, nothing in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 forbids a Member to treat

    different situations on their merits.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>38

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities submits that tariff quota licences have a considerable

    monetary value and confer significant advantages to the holders.?The same

    factual reality does not exist with regard to traditional ACP bananas.?It is

    "simply nonsensical" to find that a violation of Article I:1 of the

    GATT 1994 was committed solely on the grounds that the activity function rules

    are not used in the traditional ACP licensing system.?The European Communities

    maintains that the activity function rules were established for reasons

    relating to EC domestic competition policy, and that competition policy

    considerations fall entirely outside the ambit of the WTO Agreement as

    it is currently drafted.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>39

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 With

    respect to export certificates, the European Communities asserts that the

    possibility of passing quota rents to banana producers "does exist"

    in any situation where a licensing system exists together with limited access

    to a quantitative restriction or a tariff quota.?In the view of the European

    Communities, it would be wrong to affirm that a distinction could be drawn

    between quota rents resulting from an export certificate, and quota rents

    arising from the existence of an import licence.?The European Communities

    argues that there is no advantage for Colombian, Costa Rican and Nicaraguan

    bananas deriving from the requirement of export certificates.?The distribution

    of quota rents, provided that licences are tradeable, confers no particular

    advantage, nor has any effect on, the importation of Ecuadorian, Guatemalan,

    Honduran and Mexican bananas into the European Communities as compared with the

    access of BFA bananas to the EC market.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋牋?

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>10.牋牋牋 Measures

    Affecting Trade in Services

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>40

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities submits that the Panel erred in law by finding that there

    is no legal basis for an a priori exclusion of measures within the EC

    banana import licensing regime from the scope of the General Agreement on

    Trade in Services (the "GATS").?The European Communities argues

    that as a result of the Panel's interpretation of the scope of the GATS, there

    is a "total overlap" between the GATT 1994 and the other Annex 1A

    agreements of the WTO Agreement, on the one hand, and the GATS on the

    other hand.?Any measure can fall under both the Annex 1A agreements and the

    GATS simultaneously.?The European Communities maintains that there is no

    indication that the Panel examines, under the GATS, a different aspect or part

    of the EC licence allocation rules from that examined under the GATT 1994 or

    the Licensing Agreement.?Therefore, exactly the same measures are

    scrutinized under the GATT 1994 and under the GATS.?In the view of the

    European Communities, this is contrary to Articles I and XXVIII of the GATS.?/p>

    Furthermore, this interpretation is contrary to Article 3.2 of the DSU.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>41

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities asserts that the Panel's broad interpretation of the term

    "affecting" is not supported by the text of Article XXVIII(c) of the

    GATS.?If the category of "measures in respect of ... the purchase,

    payment or use of a service" in Article XXVIII(c) is part of the category

    of "measures affecting trade in services", then the term "in

    respect of" describes the same relationship as the term

    "affecting", namely that between measures and trade in services.?The

    European Communities maintains that for an important category of these

    measures, "in respect of" means the same as "affecting".?/p>

    The European Communities argues that the words "for the supply of a

    service" in Article XXVIII(c)(iii) indicate that the measures must relate

    to a natural or legal person in its quality of a service supplier, or in its

    activity of supplying a service.?In the view of the European Communities, the

    Panel's interpretation neglects the combined implication of Articles I and

    XXVIII(c)(iii) of the GATS, i.e. that the measures complained of must bear on

    the supply of a service.?As a consequence, the measures at issue are measures

    in respect of importation of goods and measures relating to the supply of

    services with respect to these goods.

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'> 

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>42

    style='font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Book Antiqua";letter-spacing:-.1pt'>.牋牋牋 The

    European Communities also asserts that the Panel's interpretation is not

    supported by the preparatory work for the GATS.?The European Communities

    argues that there is no indication that the broad interpretation given to the

    term "affecting" in a Note by the Secretariat

    name="_ftnref17" title="">

    class=MsoFootnoteReference>[17], which is referred to by

    the Panel in support of its interpretation, was shared by the negotiators of

    the GATS.?In addition, introducing into a general article on the scope of the

    GATS a very specific meaning of the word "affecting", derived from

    previous panel reports interpreting Article III of the GATT 1947, would be

    taking things out of context.?The European Communities also argues that the

    Panel's view that the drafters of the GATS wanted to widen the scope of the

    GATS by using the term "supply of a service" instead of the narrower

    term "delivery of a service" is in no way conclusive, because it  ……
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